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Divorce is an extremely sensitive and volatile area of law. Still, the 
facts of some divorce cases sound like a media tabloid. Accusations of 
cheating,1 child abuse,2 and even bestiality3 occur in the middle of these 
contentious cases. The invention of new technology, like video cameras, 
adds to the animosity because technology allows spouses to catch each 
other doing embarrassing and possibly unsuspected activities within the 
home.4 A new question has arisen: What happens legally when an individ-
ual secretly video records their spouse during a divorce? 
There are many laws in place today that protect an individual’s right 
to privacy.5 However, these laws are not all-inclusive, and they leave peo-
ple unprotected from intrusion in certain instances. For example, the Feder-
al Wiretapping Statute expressly prohibits auditory wiretapping, but 
remains silent on any form of videotaping.6 This gap has left courts to con-
clude that surreptitious video recordings, while possibly illegal under state 
statutes, are not prohibited under the Federal Wiretapping Statute.7 The 
Federal Wiretapping Statute also remains silent on whether it applies to 
spouses recording each other surreptitiously in the marital home.8 In the 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. The author 
would like to thank all of her family and friends for their support during law school. 
 1. See, e.g., Sperry v. Sperry, 103 S.W. Rep. 419 (Tex. Ct. App. 1907). 
 2. See, e.g., Rutter v. Rutter, 730 S.E.2d 626, 633 n.16 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). 
 3. See, e.g., Kroh v. Kroh, 567 S.E.2d 760, 764 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002). 
 4. See, e.g., Rutter, 730 S.E.2d at 633; Kroh, 567 S.E.2d at 764. 
 5. See, e.g., The Federal Wiretap Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62 
(2010); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2 (2006). 
 6. 18 U.S.C. § 2511. 
 7. See, e.g., United States v. Larios, 593 F.3d 82, 90 (1st Cir. 2010) (agreeing with other circuits 
that the plain meaning of the Federal Wiretapping Statute does not apply to silent video surveillance); 
United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1994) ([W]e find that every circuit to have addressed 
this issue has concluded that Title I and FISA neither regulate nor prohibit domestic silent video sur-
veillance”); United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 539 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the plain 
meaning of the Federal Wiretapping Statute does not apply to silent video surveillance).
 8. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2008). 
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past, this has led to some disagreement among courts.9 However, most 
courts today would agree that the Federal Wiretapping Statute applies to 
spouses.10
The absence of state video surveillance statutes leaves individuals un-
protected from surreptitious video recordings under many circumstances. 
The lack of black letter law guiding the courts can lead to curious manifes-
tations.
One area in which this presents a serious problem is with spouses. If 
anyone other than a spouse recorded an individual in the privacy of their 
own home, they would likely be outraged. This leaves an interesting ques-
tion: how does the law treat spouses in the middle of a divorce? In many 
jurisdictions today, not only can spouses surreptitiously videotape each 
other, but they can also introduce these videotapes in divorce court.11 This 
can lead to serious problems for people getting divorced. 
This Note analyzes laws regarding video surveillance and how surrep-
titious video surveillance can be misused in a divorce proceeding. The Note 
then argues for the creation of a statute or judicial action that will prevent 
spouses from recording these videos and entering them into divorce pro-
ceedings. Section I will analyze the Federal Wiretapping Statute and the 
gaps that the federal statute leaves for state law to fill.12 Section II will 
analyze state law regarding whether surreptitious video recordings are legal 
and would be allowed into divorce proceedings. There are some states with 
video recording laws that remain under-inclusive and some states that do 
not have video recording statutes at all. Section III will analyze why the 
lack of protections in video surveillance law pose several problems in di-
vorce proceedings. Such problems include increased adversity, taking sit-
uations out of context, using the recordings out of spite, negatively 
affecting the children involved, and causing the judge to consider legally 
irrelevant evidence. Section IV will propose ways to address the areas that 
current video surveillance law does not cover. 
 9. Compare Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 804 (5th Cir. 1974); Perfit v. Perfit, 693 F. 
Supp. 851, 855–56 (C.D. Cal. 1988); London v. London, 420 F. Supp. 944, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) with
Glazner v. Glazner, 347 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 2003); Kempf v. Kempf, 868 F.2d 970, 973 (8th 
Cir. 1989); Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1541 (10th Cir. 1991).
 10. See Glazner, 347 F.3d at 1214; Kempf, 868 F.2d at 973; Heggy, 944 F.2d at 1541. 
 11. There are certain areas in which even spouses may be protected from surreptitious video 
recordings in the home, such as the bedroom or bathroom. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 105 
(2012); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.45 (2003).
 12. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2008).
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I. WHAT THE FEDERAL LAW DOES (AND DOES NOT) COVER
There has been a great deal of analysis on the scope of the Federal 
Wiretapping Statute.13 The consensus among courts is that federal law does 
cover wiretapping in the marital home, with certain exceptions that exist in 
the plain language of the statute, but does not cover video surveillance. 
A. Wiretapping in the marital home 
The Federal Wiretapping Statute states that “[e]xcept as otherwise 
specifically provided in this chapter any person who intentionally inter-
cepts, endeavors to intercept . . . any wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tion . . . shall be punished . . . or subject to suit [by the Federal 
Government].”14 The exceptions provided include a situation in which the 
person who intercepts the communication is a party to the communica-
tion.15 The plain language of this statute appears to cover any person who 
engages in audio wiretapping, and does not provide an exception for spous-
es. 
The uncertainty of whether the Federal Wiretapping Statute applies to 
spouses arises from spousal tort immunity. A few early cases analyzed the 
Federal Wiretapping Statute as not including spouses, even those who are 
getting divorced, because spouses could not sue each other for torts like 
invasion of privacy.16 The law often treats spouses uniquely. There are 
protections that allow an individual to refuse to testify against their spouse 
in court.17 There are even a few states that still recognize the ability of one 
spouse to prevent the other from testifying (the Adverse Testimony Privi-
lege), although this protection has been abandoned in most states.18 The 
founding principle behind spousal tort immunity is that the husband and 
wife is one “unit.”19 Once married, a woman’s identity merges with her 
 13. See, generally, Camille Calman, Spy vs. Spouse: Regulating Surveillance Software on Shared 
Marital Computers, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2097 (2005); Robert A. Pikowsky, The Need for Revisions to 
the Law of Wiretapping and Interception of Email, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2003); 
Richard C. Turkington, Protection for Invasions of Conversational and Communication Privacy by 
Electronic Surveillance in Family, Marriage, and Domestic Disputes Under Federal and State Wiretap 
and Store Communications Acts and the Common Law, 82 NEB. L. REV. 693 (2004). 
 14. 18 U.S.C. § 2511. 
 15. Id.
 16. See Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 806 n.7 (5th Cir. 1974); Perfit v. Perfit, 693 F. Supp. 
851, 855–56 (C.D. Cal. 1988). 
 17. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 VA. L. REV. 2045, 
2053–54 (1995). 
 18. Id. at 2054. 
 19. Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359, 363 (1989). 
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husband’s identity.20 A more current argument for spousal tort immunity is 
the idea of preserving “matrimonial harmony.”21 This argument is based on 
the idea that the courts do not want to interfere with the harmony of the 
marital unit by allowing tort claims to come between spouses. 
Treating divorcing couples as a spousal unit is problematic, however, 
because people getting divorced no longer want to be part of the same unit. 
Often they are stuck fighting this battle from under the same roof because 
they cannot afford to move out, or refuse to move out for fear of losing 
claim to the house or their belongings.22 Today, the courts recognize this 
and acknowledge that even spouses are protected from wiretapping by each 
other.23
There are, however, circumstances under which spouses can legally 
record each other. For example, the Federal Wiretapping Statute allows an 
individual to record a communication if the recorder is a party or a party to 
the conversation has consented.24 In divorce proceedings, this exception 
can play out where one parent “consents” for a child and records the con-
versation between the child and the other parent.25
For example, in Pollock v. Pollock, a divorce case originating in Ken-
tucky, a mother recorded a phone conversation between her husband and 
their daughter.26 The mother then argued that the recording was legal be-
cause she vicariously consented for her daughter, and thus the circumstanc-
 20. Id. 
 21. Carl Tobias, The Imminent Demise of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 60 MONT. L. REV. 101 
(1999). 
 22. The media is filled with advice to divorcing couples, telling them that it is a bad idea to move 
out of the house during the divorce because, according to the media, it will increase costs, affect an 
individual’s right to the property, and could cause them to see their children less if the children stay at 
home. See, e.g., Silvana D. Raso, The Male Side of Divorce: What Men Need to Know, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Oct 17, 2013, 12:34 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/silvana-d-raso/the-male-side-of-
divorce-_b_1749279.html; Sam DeHority & Sunil Ramsamooj, Divorce Mistakes That Will Ruin Your 
Life, MEN’S FITNESS (Oct 17, 2013, 12:38 PM), http://www.mensfitness.com/women/dating-
advice/divorce-mistakes-that-will-ruin-your-life; Cathy Meyer, Steps to Take When Preparing For 
Divorce, ABOUT.COM (Oct 17, 2013, 12:39 PM), http://divorcesupport.about.com/od/thedivorce
process/ss/divorce_prep_8.htm. 
 23. See Glazner v. Glazner, 347 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 2003); Kempf v. Kempf, 868 F.2d 
970, 973 (8th Cir. 1989); Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1541 (10th Cir. 1991); 
see also Cary J. Mogerman & Stephanie L. Jones, Cutting Edge Issues in Family Law: Article: The New 
Era of Electronic Eavesdropping and Divorce: An Analysis of the Federal Law Relating to Eavesdrop-
ping and Privacy in the Internet Age, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 481, 499 (finding that the 
Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have expressly rejected the idea of interspousal 
immunity to the Federal Wiretapping Statute, while only the Fifth Circuit expressly acknowledges one). 
 24. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(d) (2008). 
 25. Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 610 (6th Cir. 1998); see, e.g., Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. 
Supp. 1535, 1544 (D. Utah 1993); Silas v. Silas, 680 So. 2d 368, 370 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). 
 26. Pollock, 154 F.3d at 603. 
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es fell under the consent exception to the Federal Wiretapping Statute.27
The Sixth Circuit stated that if 
the guardian has a good faith, objectively reasonable basis for believing 
that it is necessary and in the best interest of the child to consent on be-
half of his or her minor child to the taping of telephone conversations, 
the guardian may vicariously consent on behalf of the child to the record-
ing.28
Furthermore, because the mother in Pollock alleged that she was doing 
so because she believed her husband to be emotionally abusing their daugh-
ter, the court found that it was legal for the mother to record the conversa-
tion.29
B. Video Wiretapping 
Video wiretapping can be an even more sensitive area than audio 
wiretapping. Videotaping an individual while they are doing things around 
the house goes even further than recording their conversations. However, 
the Federal Wiretapping Statute does not cover this area, it only explicitly 
provides for “wire, oral, or electronic communication.”30
This leaves state law to cover an entire area of surveillance. Some 
states have chosen to enact laws regarding video surveillance, and these 
laws vary widely in what they cover.31 On the other hand, many states have 
modeled their anti-wiretapping acts on the federal act, and have yet to cre-
ate any legislation covering video surveillance.32
Therefore, the Federal Wiretapping Statute covers spouses recording 
each other under a large percentage of circumstances. However, state laws 
still have many areas to fill, and one of the largest gaps left up to the states 
is video surveillance. 
 27. Id. at 606. 
 28. Id. at 610. 
 29. Id. at 611. 
 30. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511. 
 31. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-32 (1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539d (2004); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-62 (2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.45 (2003). 
 32. See, e.g., Kroh v. Kroh, 567 S.E.2d 760, 763 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that while the wife 
admits that she videotaped her husband’s activities, the plain language of the North Carolina and Feder-
al Wiretapping statutes only cover oral communications); Minotty v. Baudo, 42 So. 3d 824, 832 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (“As the Florida statute is patterned after the federal statute and contains essential-
ly the same language, we conclude that silent video surveillance is not covered.”). 
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II. STATE LAW
While there are a few states that have adopted statutes prohibiting vid-
eo surveillance under certain circumstances,33 many states do not have such 
statutes.34 This section will discuss some of the state statutes regarding 
video surveillance and mention ways in which they leave uncertainty as to 
(1) whether recording spouses during divorce is illegal and (2) if it is legal, 
whether the recordings are allowed into divorce proceedings. This section 
also mentions how state courts handle spousal recording during divorce 
where there are no statutes regarding the issue. 
A. States with minimal video surveillance statutes 
Some states regulate video surveillance only to a minimal extent. 
These states include Nevada and West Virginia, which prohibit video re-
cordings in certain specific locations; Massachusetts, New York, and South 
Carolina, which prohibit voyeuristic video recordings; and Alabama, which 
prohibits video recording while trespassing.35
Some states only regulate video surveillance in specific locations or 
under specific circumstances. For example, Nevada and West Virginia have 
very specific statutes regulating video surveillance.36 Nevada has a statute 
that prohibits “any kind of surreptitious electronic surveillance on the 
grounds of any facility owned or leased by the State of Nevada without the 
knowledge of the person being observed,” but provides exceptions for law 
enforcement and security personnel.37 Nevada also uses similar language to 
prohibit surveillance on public school property or on a college campus.38
West Virginia specifically prohibits video surveillance by an employer.39
The statute makes it a misdemeanor for employers to record their employ-
 33. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-32(a); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 331.220 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 393.400 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 396.970 (1993); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 
(1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 105; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.45; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
250.40; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-470 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 
17-A, § 511 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539d; UTAH CODE ANN, § 76-9-402 (1973). 
 34. See Kroh, 567 S.E.2d at 763 (discussing G.S. § 15A-287(1)(a)); Minotty, 42 So. 3d at 832 
(discussing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03 (2010)); People v. Drennan, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584, 588 (Cal. 
App. Ct. 2000) (discussing CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 (2011)). 
 35. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-32(a); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 393.400; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
396.970; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 105; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
250.45; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.40; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-470. 
 36. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 331.220; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 393.400; NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 396.970; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20. 
 37. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 331.220. 
 38. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 393.400; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 396.970. 
 39. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20. 
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ees in public and private locations.40 The specific nature of these statutes 
prevents them from being used where a spouse records the other spouse 
during a divorce. 
Some states have video surveillance laws that are specific to voyeur-
ism or other sexually deviant behavior. Massachusetts, New York, and 
South Carolina all have statutes that protect an individual from being rec-
orded with intimate areas uncovered.41
To be convicted for surreptitious video surveillance under Massachu-
setts law, the recorder must have done the video surveillance in an area 
where an individual would have a reasonable expectation of privacy and
the recorder must have videotaped the unknowing individual nude or par-
tially nude.42
The first problem with this statute is that it does not specify whether 
an individual has an expectation of privacy from their own spouse during a 
divorce proceeding for the purposes of this statute.43 Some statutes specifi-
cally define an expectation of privacy to cover an area in which an individ-
ual would reasonably feel comfortable disrobing, such as a bedroom, 
bathroom, and so on, as hinted at by the requirement of partial nudity in the 
Massachusetts statute.44 In the absence of an explicit definition, this issue 
can be very problematic because there are strong arguments for and against 
stating that an individual has an expectation of privacy from the spouse 
they are divorcing. On the one hand, as stated in an early Fifth Circuit case: 
A third-party intrusion into the marital home, even if instigated by one 
spouse, is an offense against a spouse’s privacy of a much greater magni-
tude than is personal surveillance by the other spouse. The latter, it 
seems to us, is consistent with whatever expectations of privacy spouses 
might have vis-a-vis each other within the marital home.45
People getting divorced are often people who once shared the most in-
timate aspects of their lives with each other. Therefore, it makes sense that 
they have little to no expectation of privacy from each other. 
On the other hand, there are a few problems with this reasoning. First, 
there is a significant difference between sharing personal habits, secrets, 
and other intimate things with your spouse and actually having your spouse 
 40. Id. 
 41. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 105; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.45; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
250.40; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-470. 
 42. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 105. 
 43. See id.
 44. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 105; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.40; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, 
§ 511 (defining “private place” as “a place where one may reasonably expect to be safe from surveil-
lance, including, but not limited to, changing or dressing rooms, bathrooms and similar places”). 
 45. Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 1974).
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record those intimate things. Second, people divorcing rarely continue to 
share the intimate aspects of their lives with each other; sometimes they 
continue to share the marital home for a myriad of reasons, but this does 
not mean they want to continue to share the intimate aspects of their lives 
with each other.46 The lack of guidance from the legislature leaves the 
court to weigh these alternatives on its own. 
The second problem with the Massachusetts statute is that it requires 
that the individual be recorded nude or partially nude.47 If one member of 
the household sets up a video camera in the living room, for example, and 
no one walks through the living room nude or partially nude, the recorder 
has not violated the statute, regardless of whether the recorded individual 
had an expectation of privacy in the living room. 
New York law covers a little more than the Massachusetts law. In 
New York, the first category of unlawful surveillance requires intent and 
some sort of specific purpose, including amusement, entertainment, profit, 
degrading or abusing another, or sexual gratification.48 This category of 
unlawful surveillance also requires that the individual be in the process of 
dressing or undressing, or partially nude, for the recorder to be convicted. 
New York’s second category of unlawful surveillance requires that the 
recorder does the recording intentionally “[f]or no legitimate purpose.”49
Here, the person does not have to be recorded while undressing, so long as 
they were recorded “in a bedroom, changing room, fitting room, restroom, 
toilet, bathroom, washroom, shower or any room assigned to guests or pa-
trons in a motel, hotel or inn, without such person’s knowledge or con-
sent.”50 Unfortunately, neither of these categories provides statutory relief 
for an individual being recorded while fully clothed in areas of the house 
such as the kitchen, living room, basement, and so on.51
 46. Some reasons to remain together in a marital home include: attempting to obtain “leverage” 
over the other spouse, believing they have a right to remain in their home, nowhere else to go, etc. See,
e.g., Silvana D. Raso, The Male Side of Divorce: What Men Need to Know, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct 17, 
2013, 12:34 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/silvana-d-raso/the-male-side-of-divorce-
_b_1749279.html; Sam DeHority & Sunil Ramsamooj, Divorce Mistakes That Will Ruin Your Life,
MEN’S FITNESS (Oct 17, 2013, 12:38 PM), http://www.mensfitness.com/women/dating-advice/divorce-
mistakes-that-will-ruin-your-life; Cathy Meyer, Steps to Take When Preparing For Divorce,
ABOUT.COM (Oct 17, 2013, 12:39 PM), http://divorcesupport.about.com/od/thedivorce
process/ss/divorce_prep_8.htm. 
 47. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 105.
 48. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.45. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id.
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South Carolina’s statute prohibits voyeurism and what the statute calls 
“peeping tom[s].”52 The portion of the statute prohibiting “peeping tom[s]” 
states that 
[i]t is unlawful for a person to be . . . a peeping tom on or about the 
premises of another or to go upon the premises of another for the pur-
pose of becoming . . . a peeping tom. The term “peeping tom”, as used in 
this section, is defined as a person who peeps through windows, doors, 
or other like places, on or about the premises of another, for the purpose 
of spying upon or invading the privacy of the persons spied upon and 
any other conduct of a similar nature, that tends to invade the privacy of 
others. The term “peeping tom” also includes any person who employs 
the use of video or audio equipment for the purposes set forth in this sec-
tion.53
This statute is fairly inclusive in that it covers observing any activity 
that invades the observed individual’s privacy.54 However, this statute re-
quires an individual to go on the premises of another.55 This statute, there-
fore, cannot be applied in circumstances where both spouses are living 
together during the divorce and one records the other because the recording 
occurs on their own premises. 
Requiring some sort of trespassing on private property is a common 
element of surveillance crimes in a few states. Alabama’s surveillance stat-
ute states “[a] person commits the crime of criminal surveillance if he in-
tentionally engages in surveillance while trespassing in a private place.”56
The comments provided during the enactment of the statute state “Alabama 
law had no provision expressly covering surveillance. . . . Criminal surveil-
lance, as defined in this section, . . . must be done through visual observa-
tion or photography.”57 The first problem that arises under the statute is the 
uncertainty of whether it covers video cameras. Assuming that “photog-
raphy” covers video cameras, which is already stretching the black letter 
law, the second problem is that the statute only covers surveillance done 
while trespassing.58
The Alabama statute leaves out several important considerations. The 
statute does not contemplate video surveillance done in store dressing 
rooms, public bathrooms, or other circumstances not involving trespassing, 
and the statute’s plain language does not cover recording done in one’s 
 52. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-470 (2001). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id.
 55. Id. 
 56. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-32(a). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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own home. Therefore, for the purposes of spouses surreptitiously recording 
each other, this statute does not afford any protection to the recorded party. 
B. More inclusive video recording statutes 
On the other hand, a few states provide fairly inclusive video surveil-
lance statutes. Georgia, Michigan, Maine and Utah, for example, all have 
statutes that prohibit a wide range of video surveillance. However, as a 
recent case in Georgia demonstrates, these states still may not provide 
enough protection for spouses going through a divorce.59
The Georgia Wiretapping Statute does a good job of covering circum-
stances that the Federal Wiretapping Statute does not cover. It makes it 
unlawful for “[a]ny person, through the use of any device, without the con-
sent of all persons observed, to observe, photograph, or record the activities 
of another which occur in any private place and out of public view.”60 The 
statute then provides certain circumstances in which the surveillance is 
lawful, such as “[t]o use for security purposes, crime prevention, or crime 
detection any device to observe, photograph, or record the activities of 
persons who are within the curtilage of the residence of the person using 
such device.”61
This statute is more helpful than others for a few reasons: First, the 
statute covers recording “through the use of any device.”62 This language 
makes the statute electronically neutral, and it allows for some flexibility as 
technology progresses and new recording devices are invented. Second, the 
statute covers activities “which occur in any private place and out of public 
view.”63 The statute does not use language such as “reasonable expectation 
of privacy,” suggesting that it does not matter whether the individual rea-
sonably expected the activities to be private from the recorder so long as 
the activities were conducted “out of public view.” The home is almost 
certainly considered “out of public view.” Finally, the statute lists crime 
detection, crime prevention, and security purposes as exceptions. Excep-
tions such as these have certain advantages, and they support public policy 
by encouraging private citizens to aid in crime prevention and detection 
and by promoting safety. The problem with these exceptions is that they 
create a question of motive, the truth of which can be very difficult to de-
termine. 
 59. See Rutter v. Rutter, 730 S.E.2d 626, 628 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). 
 60. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2) (2010). 
 61. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2)(C). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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The next portion of the Georgia Code that leaves the statute open to 
misuse is the portion that states that a “videotape . . . made in accordance 
with this subparagraph, or a copy thereof . . . shall be admissible in a judi-
cial proceeding, without the consent of any person observed.”64 The statute 
does not specify what type of judicial proceeding the video shall be admis-
sible in.65 It is possible that the legislature only intended this evidence to be 
allowed in for criminal proceedings, or for only criminal or tort proceed-
ings, like trespass. It is not clear from the language, but in light of the fact 
that the legislature designed the exception to deter crime, it is unlikely that 
the legislature meant for divorce proceedings to be included. 
In Rutter v. Rutter, an appellate court in Georgia was confronted with 
the question of whether a recording was permissible and should be allowed 
into a divorce proceeding.66 During the divorce proceedings, Stacy Rutter 
was no longer sleeping at the parties’ marital residence, but she kept 
clothes there, performed some daily chores there, received mail there, and 
continued to pay a portion of the mortgage.67 Among other things, the di-
vorce proceedings involved a disagreement over child custody.68
While in the process of obtaining their divorce, Stacy Rutter surrepti-
tiously installed video surveillance in the marital home where Charles Rut-
ter was staying.69 Stacy claimed that she installed the cameras while 
attempting to catch Charles committing a crime, specifically, child abuse.70
The trial court allowed the video recordings into evidence, and Charles 
Rutter immediately appealed the decision.71
The appellate court first found that Stacy had recorded her husband 
legally.72 The court noted that Stacy was probably not trying to prevent 
crime, nor was it likely that she installed the video cameras for security 
purposes, as she installed the cameras secretly.73 Rather, the court deter-
mined that Stacy was most likely recording Charles in an attempt to catch 
him committing a crime solely to help her gain custody of their children, 
rather than to deter the crime or to press charges.74 However, even with this 
interpretation, he court held that under the Georgia statute, it is permissible 
 64. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2)(C). 
 65. Id.
 66. Rutter v. Rutter, 730 S.E.2d 626, 626 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). 
 67. Id. at 632–633. 
 68. Id. at 633. 
 69. Id. at 626. 
 70. Id. at 633 n.16. There was no evidence that Charles abused Stacy or the children. Id.
 71. Id. at 626. 
 72. Id. at 628. 
 73. Id. at 633.
 74. Id.
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to record activities within the curtilage of an individual’s own home in 
order to detect crime, and that is what Stacy Rutter was doing.75
Furthermore, the court held that this evidence is admissible in a di-
vorce proceeding.76 The statute explicitly states that a videotape made for 
one of the exceptions provided “shall be admissible in a judicial proceed-
ing, without the consent of any person . . . recorded.”77 This language is 
what led the Georgia court to allow Stacy Rutter’s recording of her hus-
band into the divorce proceedings.78
One big factor in the court’s decision was the rule of lenity.79 The rule 
of lenity protects defendants in criminal court by encouraging courts to 
interpret criminal laws narrowly.80 The court in Rutter argued that the 
Georgia statute is a criminal one, and that because Stacy’s video recording 
could have been interpreted as a crime, the analysis warranted applying the 
rule of lenity.81 However, there are a few issues with applying the rule of 
lenity here. 
First, the court could have held that the recording was legal under the 
Georgia statute but not admissible in the divorce proceedings because the 
latter goes beyond the legislative intent. The court could have supported 
this interpretation with the fact that the statute says that a videotape made 
under one of the exceptions to the statute “may be disclosed by such a resi-
dent to the district attorney or a law enforcement officer and shall be ad-
missible in a judicial proceeding.”82 The fact that the statute first states that 
the recorder may disclose the videotape to a district attorney or policeman 
suggests that the statute was solely referring to criminal proceedings. While 
there are arguments against this interpretation,83 the issue of whether to 
allow the recording into divorce proceedings has no bearing on the crimi-
nality of Stacy’s act, and therefore does not warrant the rule of lenity. 
The second issue with using the rule of lenity here is that one of the 
main guiding principles behind the rule of lenity is to provide fair notice 
before convicting an individual of a crime.84 In Rutter, Stacy was not in 
danger of being convicted of a crime. The purpose behind applying the rule 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 628. 
 77. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2)(C) (2010). 
 78. Rutter, 730 S.E.2d at 628. 
 79. Id. at 632. 
 80. Phillip M. Spector, The Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 512 (2001-2002). 
 81. Rutter, 730 S.E.2d at 632.  
 82. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2)(C). 
 83. For example, why did the legislature not say “criminal proceedings” instead of “judicial 
proceedings” if that is what they meant? 
 84. Spector, supra note 80, at 535 n.131. 
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of lenity was not present. If anything, it is just as important for Charles to 
know that his wife can surreptitiously record him and have that evidence 
introduced in court as it is for Stacy to know that she can do so. This case 
does not involve a situation in which the state is bringing an action against 
one individual and the individual needs protection. Rutter involved two 
individuals, and under this fact pattern, Charles was arguably the one who 
needed legal protection from his wife’s recordings. Therefore, the rule of 
lenity does not fulfill its protective purpose under the facts of the case. 
One problem with the outcome in this case is that it leaves the statute 
open to misuse. First, as acknowledged in Rutter, Stacy was recording her 
husband for the purposes of child custody.85 Although she was trying to 
catch him hurting the children, she at no point alleged that she was doing so 
to file criminal charges or to deter crime.86 The reason she was trying to 
catch him commit a crime was for child custody purposes, a noble purpose 
if Charles was indeed abusing the children, but one not related to criminal 
proceedings.87 This holding makes it easy for individuals to trump up 
charges and surreptitiously record their spouse in the marital home. 
Second, Stacy did not have to provide any evidence that Charles might 
have been abusing the children.88 She at no point had to show pictures of 
injuries, or had to report that her children had told her Charles was abusing 
them, or had to provide an affidavit or testimony from a doctor, or anything 
of that nature.89 Consequently, this ruling could open divorce courts to a 
huge amount of abuse. If one party simply has to allege that the other party 
may be committing a crime, they could easily lie to the court without any 
factual evidence to support the allegation. In Rutter, even after Stacy rec-
orded Charles, the court did not find any evidence of child abuse.90 There-
fore, the statute does not provide sufficient protection from false allegations 
to the recorded party. 
Third, by the time the recorder introduces these videotapes into evi-
dence, they have already recorded the other party. Therefore, it is easy for 
one party to place cameras around the residence, wait to catch their spouse 
doing something illegal, and then claim that they were trying to catch their 
spouse doing it in the first place. 
 85. Rutter, 730 S.E.2d at 633. 
 86. Id.
 87. See id.
 88. Id. at 633 n.16. 
 89. Id.
 90. Id. 
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Fourth, nothing in the statute requires that the crime in question be 
committed for the recordings to be legal. With all of these risks for abuse 
and uncertainties, the recorded party will usually be unfairly disadvantaged. 
While Stacy’s situation was possibly an extreme situation because it in-
volved allegations of child abuse, the party being recorded could be caught 
doing a number of things. Furthermore, once the recordings are taken, there 
is the potential for blackmail, especially if the party was caught doing 
something not necessarily illegal but possibly embarrassing, such as walk-
ing around the house not completely clothed, watching adult videos, or 
even dancing or singing in an unusual manner. 
The multiple avenues available for abuse demonstrate the different 
ways in which spouses can abuse statutes such as the Georgia statute in 
light of Rutter.
Michigan, Maine, and Utah all have similar statutes to the one in 
Georgia regarding video recordings.91 All three have statutes that state that 
it is illegal to install, place, or use “in any private place, without the consent 
of the person or persons entitled to privacy in that place, any device 
for . . . recording . . . [the] events in that place.”92 This portion of the stat-
utes, like Georgia’s, uses the terms “private place” and “any device,” which 
have the advantages of covering more circumstances than other video sur-
veillance statutes.93
However, some of the statutes include language that limits the applica-
tion of the statute. For example, Maine further defines “private place” as “a 
place where one may reasonably expect to be safe from surveillance, in-
cluding, but not limited to, changing or dressing rooms, bathrooms, and 
similar places.”94 The definition suggests that particular rooms, rather than 
entire homes, are subject to the “private place” analysis. This leaves open 
the possibility that recording an individual in their living room or other 
places around the house does not violate the statute. 
Furthermore, Michigan’s statute also provides exceptions like Geor-
gia’s.95 Michigan’s surveillance statute states “[t]his section does not pro-
hibit security monitoring in a residence if conducted by or at the direction 
of the owner or principal occupant of that residence unless conducted for a 
 91. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 511 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539d (2004); UTAH 
CODE ANN, § 76-9-402 (1973). 
 92. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 511; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539d; UTAH CODE ANN, § 
76-9-402. 
 93. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 511; MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 750.539d; UTAH CODE ANN, § 76-9-402. 
 94. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 511. 
 95. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539d.
2014] SURREPTITIOUS VIDEO SURVEILLANCE 891 
lewd or lascivious purpose.”96 This exception is arguably less susceptible 
to the type of misuse that occurred in Rutter. The Michigan statute remains 
silent on whether the video recording will be allowed into judicial proceed-
ings, rather than explicitly allowing it in.97 However, the law does not ex-
pressly prohibit the evidence, which leaves the decision to each individual 
case, and therefore susceptible to misuse.98
When comparing the substance of the Michigan statute to the Georgia 
statute, there are notable similarities.99 The Michigan statute states that 
security monitoring by the owner of the residence is not prohibited, while 
Georgia’s statute states that security monitoring, crime detection, and crime 
prevention are not prohibited.100 While Michigan’s statute is admittedly 
narrower, it is still a question of intent. In Rutter, Stacy Rutter admitted that 
she recorded her husband specifically for the purposes of the child custody 
dispute.101 However, if she had not admitted that fact, the court may not 
have had a way to determine her intent. Stacy could just as easily have lied 
about her intent in installing the video surveillance, as could any other par-
ty to a divorce. Therefore, while the Michigan statute may make it more 
difficult for parties who have already admitted their intentions behind in-
stalling the surreptitious video surveillance; it is almost as easy to lie about 
intention under the Michigan statute as it is under the Georgia statute. 
There is a strong policy argument for allowing video recordings for 
security purposes, such as the statutes allow in Georgia and Michigan, and 
this article is not advocating to get rid of these exceptions.102 Furthermore, 
it is true that many crimes rely upon intent, and the legislature is being 
reasonable in relying upon intent when determining whether to criminalize 
video surveillance. However, there are alternative ways to restrict misuse 
of the exception other than abandoning the exception all together that merit 
attention, as discussed in the proposal section below. 
Finally, possibly the most extensive video surveillance statute is Ver-
mont’s, which states that “[n]o person shall intentionally. . .film. . .in any 
format a person without that person’s knowledge and consent while [the 
taped individual] is in a place where he or she would have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy within a home or residence.”103 By using inclusive 
 96. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539d. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2)(C); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539d. 
 100. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2)(C); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539d.  
 101. Rutter v. Rutter, 730 S.E.2d 626, 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). 
 102. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2)(C); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539d. 
 103. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2605 (2009). 
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language such as “in any format” and “within a home or residence,” this 
statute could reasonably be interpreted to cover circumstances where one 
spouse records another during a divorce.104 However, this still depends on 
the court’s interpretation of “expectation of privacy.” Despite the problems 
with each of these states’ statutes, they are ahead of many other states by 
having such an inclusive video recording statute. 
C. States that do not have any video surveillance statutes 
Many states have modeled their wiretapping statutes after the Federal 
Wiretapping Statute.105 The problem that arises is that these statutes then 
do not protect against video surveillance.106 This in turn leaves the courts 
with nothing to turn to when situations arise such as the one in Rutter.
For example, an analysis of the North Carolina Wiretapping Statute 
arises in Kroh v. Kroh, a case involving the litigation of a particularly ad-
versarial divorce.107 Among other things, Teresa Kroh accused her husband 
of sexually deviant acts, recorded his conversations with their children, and 
placed a hidden video camera in the marital home.108 Teresa Kroh admitted 
that she hid the camera and videotaped her husband’s activities.109 Despite 
this and the malevolent intent behind the recordings, the court felt forced to 
hold that 
under the plain language of G.S. § 15A-287(1)(a) (as well as the federal 
Omnibus Act), only oral communications are covered by the Act. Thus, 
Teresa Kroh’s videotaping of her husband would not violate the Elec-
tronic Surveillance Act unless such videotaping also included an audio 
recording.110
The court based this holding in large part on the fact that it “note[d] 
the many similarities between the Electronic Surveillance Act and the fed-
eral wiretapping statute.”111 The court then referenced federal court rulings 
regarding the Federal Wiretapping Statute in support of its conclusion.112
 104. See id.
 105. See, e.g., Kroh v. Kroh, 567 S.E.2d 760, 763 (N.C. 2002) (discussing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
287(1)(a) (1995)); Minotty v. Baudo, 42 So. 3d 824, 832 (2010) (discussing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03 
(2010)). 
 106. See Kroh, 567 S.E.2d at 763 (discussing G.S. § 15A-287(1)(a)); Minotty, 42 So. 3d at 832 
(discussing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03). 
 107. Kroh, 567 S.E.2d at 762 n.1. 
 108. Id. at 762–64. 
 109. Id. at 762. 
 110. Id. at 763. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
2014] SURREPTITIOUS VIDEO SURVEILLANCE 893 
Other states have also reached the conclusion that their wiretapping statutes 
cover audio surveillance, but not video surveillance.113
It is possible that the legislature left video surveillance out of penal 
statutes because they have not agreed upon the appropriate language to use 
in criminalizing surreptitious video surveillance. As demonstrated by the 
many different state video surveillance laws, there are many different ways 
to criminalize video surveillance.114 On the other hand, it is possible that 
the legislature has not criminalized video surveillance unintentionally be-
cause the technology is somewhat new. Because of the quick evolution of 
technology, a “device neutral” statute such as the ones used in Georgia, 
Michigan, Maine and Utah can be especially helpful.115 Regardless of how 
or why the ability to video record one’s spouse during a divorce exists, it is 
now the responsibility of the legislature to consider how it needs to react to 
the outcomes demonstrated in cases like Rutter and Kroh.
III. WHY BRINGING VIDEO RECORDINGS INTO DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS IS A 
PROBLEM
Allowing video recordings into divorce and child custody cases, as 
was done in Rutter and Kroh, can lead to serious problems. This section 
will outline some of the possible problems that can arise. These problems 
include increased adversity, taking situations out of context, using the re-
cordings out of spite, negatively affecting the children involved, and caus-
ing the judge to consider legally irrelevant evidence. To illustrate some of 
these problems, this section will introduce hypothetical situations to pro-
vide context to the possible issues. 
A. Allowing video recordings in the home and introducing them into di-
vorce proceedings can increase hostility. 
One spouse recording the other can create hostility on both ends, for 
the recorder and the recorded. Once the recorded spouse realizes their 
spouse has recorded him or her, he or she may feel betrayed, and he or she 
may become defensive and wonder what the recorder has caught on cam-
era. Furthermore, the recorder can catch the recorded spouse doing some-
thing the recorder does not like. For instance, the recorder may catch his or 
 113. See, e.g., Minotty, 42 So. 3d at 832 (discussing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03 (2010)); Drennan,
101 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 587 (Cal. App. 3d 2000) (discussing CAL. PENAL CODE § 630).
 114. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 511 (2007); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (1999). 
 115. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 511; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
750.539d (2004); UTAH CODE ANN, § 76-9-402 (1973). 
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her spouse talking about the recorder negatively, saying something to the 
children that the recorder does not like, or drinking alcohol before going to 
work.116
For example, suppose Mary and Jack Russo are getting a divorce. 
Mary’s attorney claims to have mailed certain documents to Mary’s marital 
home that Mary does not remember receiving. Because Jack is the one who 
sleeps at the marital residence while Mary is staying with her sister, Mary 
suspects Jack of throwing away the mail to hurt her in the divorce case. She 
secretly hides video cameras in the house, including one pointing to Jack’s 
personal safe in case he is hiding anything in regards to their divorce case. 
Jack finds the video camera recording his safe, and, believing Mary to 
be trying to get the combination and steal from him, hides his own video 
cameras throughout the house. Neither party can find every video camera 
hidden by the other, and even if they can, they have no way of knowing 
that they really have found all of them. 
Although both parties may have already been at each other’s throats 
prior to the video camera incident, the introduction of video cameras has 
only made the situation worse.117 Both parties now feel as though they can-
not trust the other and neither feel comfortable in their marital home. 
Furthermore, while the viewers are going through the days of video 
surveillance, there is no guarantee they will catch the other committing any 
crimes. However, because both parties placed the cameras around the 
house trying to catch the other committing a crime, be it mail tampering or 
stealing, under the Georgia statute these recordings may pass as legal and 
may even be admissible in the divorce cases.118
Even if they do not introduce these recordings in court, Jack and Mary 
may catch the other spouse doing something that they do not like, such as 
going through the other person’s drawers, picking the kids up from school 
early when they agreed the kids should stay for band practice, or something 
else along those lines. The little things that might have slipped by and not 
affected the case have now blown up, and each spouse has gotten more 
defensive and more competitive with each other. This has likely reduced 
the chance that both parties would be willing to settle or to move the di-
 116.  See, e.g., Pollock, 154 F.3d at 604 (recorder heard her daughter complaining about being in 
her custody); Simpson, 490 F.2d at 804 (recorder heard another man making advances on wife, and 
“while the wife was resisting, she was not doing so in a firm and final fashion”). 
 117.  There are several cases where the recorded spouse sued the recorder. See, e.g., Kroh, 567 
S.E.2d at 762 (husband sued wife for recording him); Thompson, 838 F. Supp. at 1537 (same).
 118. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2)(C). 
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vorce proceedings along without much dispute.119 The increased adversity 
can draw out the divorce, which is costly for the parties and problematic for 
the crowded court system.120
B. Videos are often taken out of context. 
Videos take things out of context in a few ways: First, people do 
things at home that they are not likely to do in public, and it is possible to 
catch someone at their worst at home when that side would normally not 
come out in public.121 A spouse may spend an hour complaining to himself 
or herself about the other spouse in the house alone, but spend the rest of 
the time in public being civil and trying to get through the divorce without 
causing trouble. The introduction of video cameras in the house can show 
one moment when the recorded spouse loses their temper, and now the 
recorder knows about that one moment where she otherwise would not 
have—some occurrence that was otherwise negligible now takes center 
stage because the other party has viewed it. Second, the video camera only 
catches what people do in a particular room or at a particular spot in a 
room. Therefore, the video camera will almost certainly miss important 
pieces of an incident. 
As a hypothetical example, Alex and Lindsey Johnson are in the mid-
dle of an agreed, non-contentious divorce. Then one day, Alex notices their 
dog, Captain, is limping. Alex knows Lindsey has never liked Captain be-
cause he chewed up a lot of her shoes, so he suspects Lindsey of animal 
abuse. Rather than confronting her and stirring up trouble, Alex decides to 
put video surveillance around the house just to make sure that Lindsey is 
not hurting Captain. 
While watching these recordings, Alex sees Lindsey come in around 
lunchtime, when they both know Alex will not be home because he works 
too far away to come home for lunch. Lindsey came home with a man Alex 
has never met before, and while he was there the man walked around the 
 119.  It is possible that it will instead increase litigation between the parties. See, e.g., Kroh, 567 
S.E.2d at 762 (husband sued wife for recording him); Thompson, 838 F. Supp. at 1537 (same). 
 120.  Divorces can be expensive. While they vary greatly, the courts have found that attorneys’ fees 
for only one party can reasonably be $175,000-$185,000. Darden v. Witham, 209 S.E.2d 42, 47 (S.C. 
1974) (finding $175,000 to wife’s attorney reasonable); Adams v. Adams, 376 So. 2d 1204, 1205–06 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (finding $185,000 to wife’s attorneys reasonable, stating the amount to be 
“entirely consistent with the evidence as to the hours and effort expended, the results achieved, and the 
quality of the services rendered”). 
 121.  The law itself displays a sort of “reverence . . . for the individual's right of privacy in his 
house.” Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958). 
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house as though he knew it well. Then the man and Lindsey went into the 
bedroom and did not come out for a while. 
When Lindsey learns that Alex was recording her, she is furious. Alex 
is positive that Lindsey is having an affair, and nothing Lindsey says will 
change his mind. It is true that suspicions and accusations happen frequent-
ly without video recordings.122 However, allowing video recordings multi-
plies the possibility of these events happening. Furthermore, people do 
things carelessly in the privacy of their own home that they generally 
would not do in public.  
Admittedly, if the court allows part of the video in, the opposing party 
may ask the court to bring in the rest of the footage.123 However, this does 
not necessarily reduce the likelihood of the videos causing problems. The 
recording party knows where the cameras are and is less likely to be caught 
doing something. Therefore, introducing the rest of the footage is not very 
likely to help the recorded party. Furthermore, the introduction of the rest 
of the contents will not always help provide context. Videos may only 
catch what happened in one room, what happens when the individual is in 
the direct path of the camera, and so on. Finally, there may be hours of 
recordings to go through, some possibly more embarrassing than the clip 
introduced. Therefore, the other party may be unwilling to either go 
through the days of recordings, allow their attorney to go through the foot-
age, or allow additional embarrassing footage to be shown in court. 
C. Video recordings are as likely to be used for spite as they are to be used 
for any other reason. 
There are many ways in which the recorder can use video recordings 
of his or her spouse for spite. Today’s technology consists of numerous 
different online media outlets and more are created every day. There are 
now websites such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and others that allow 
people to share information.124
 122.  See, e.g., Lee v. Lee, 477 N.W.2d 429, 431 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (wife accused husband of 
affair, which he denied); Zamstein v. Marvasti, 692 A.2d 781, 783 (Conn. 1997) (wife accused husband 
of child abuse). 
 123.  Consider Federal Rules of Evidence § 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded 
Statements, which states “If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse 
party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part — or any other writing or recorded 
statement — that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.” 28 U.S.C. § 106 (2013). 
 124.  YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014); FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014); Twitter, https://twitter.com/ (last visited Mar. 
25, 2014). 
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The reality in a world such as this is that there is the possibility for a 
much larger privacy invasion than ever before. Today, all it takes is record-
ing a video on a phone and uploading it to YouTube for thousands, eventu-
ally even millions to see the video.125 With all of these possibilities, it is 
even more important that there are laws in place protecting people’s priva-
cy in their own home. 
Even if there are laws protecting what users can and cannot post on 
the internet, the rules often cannot be enforced until the user has already 
posted the video and thousands of people have seen it. Furthermore, the 
recorder can also send the video to friends of either spouse, employers, or 
other people in an attempt to embarrass or hurt the recorded spouse.126
As an example of a spouse using the recordings for spite, imagine the 
situation with Alex and Lindsey Johnson again. Alex caught Lindsey going 
into the bedroom with another man. To make matters worse, the other man 
is a married man that Alex knows. Now, to get back at Lindsey, Alex plans 
to show the videotape to the other man’s wife to ruin their marriage as well, 
just to hurt Lindsey. 
Spouses see sides of each other that almost no one else does, because 
at one point they trusted each other with this intimacy.127 When that inti-
mate relationship is dissolving, the parties can hurt each other in ways that 
no one else can.128 Additionally, they often continue to have access to the 
same home and personal property that they had during the marriage.129
Therefore, it is critical that legislatures protect the parties from certain pri-
vacy invasions. 
 125.  Youtube has “more than 1 billion daily video views, with more than 24 hours of new video 
uploaded to the site every minute.” Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 2012).  
 126.  Theresa Kroh, in Kroh v. Kroh, told numerous third parties that her husband had sex with a 
dog, including her husband’s sister and friends. 567 S.E.2d at 762. It is possible that, if she had caught 
the act on videotape, she would have sent the tape to those individuals. 
 127.  Naomi Cahn & Robert Tuttle, Dependency and Delegation: The Ethics of Marital Represen-
tation, 22 SEATTLE UNIV. L. R. 97, 113 (1998) (citing CATHERINE KOHLER RIESSMAN, DIVORCE TALK:
WOMEN AND MEN MAKE SENSE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 212 (1990)) (“When most people 
marry, they expect emotional intimacy, companionship, and sexual fulfillment with their partner. They 
envision a ‘companionate marriage – the belief that husband and wife should be each other's closest 
companion.’”).
 128.  Id. at 116 (“Just as marital intimacy opens the possibility for some of life's richest experienc-
es, it also leaves spouses vulnerable to some of life's most devastating emotional, and even physical, 
injuries.”). 
 129.  See, e.g., Kroh, 567 S.E.2d at 762; Rutter, 730 S.E.2d at 632–33 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (“[Stacy 
Rutter] continued, during the time that she used the video surveillance devices, to keep clothes and 
other personal items at the marital residence, she paid a portion of the mortgage for that residence, she 
received some mail at that residence, and she spent some portion of every other day at the residence, 
doing things like cooking, eating, bathing, and washing clothes.”). 
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D. Introducing video recordings can negatively affect the children involved 
Child custody battles often negatively affect children in a number of 
ways.130 Parents may use children to get information about each other, tell 
the children that the other parent is doing things to hurt them in the divorce 
proceedings, and so on.131 This can leave children feeling stuck in the mid-
dle.
When parents are recording children without the children’s 
knowledge, and the children later discover that they were being recorded, it 
can affect how secure the children feel in their own home. They might have 
been doing some embarrassing acts, talking negatively about one or both 
parents,132 or even simply discussing private issues with a parent or a 
friend. Regardless of what they are doing, the knowledge that their parent 
was videotaping them to hurt the other parent can make the child feel like a 
casualty in his or her parents’ divorce.133
Additionally, one parent using the children against the other is one of 
the biggest causes of emotional trauma in children during divorce and cus-
tody proceedings.134 If the children know that one parent is recording the 
other, they may feel obligated to tell the other parent.135 Alternatively, they 
may promise not to tell the other parent. In either scenario, the secret is 
pitting the child against one parent. The situation can negatively affect the 
child’s relationship with one of his or her parents, if not both. Furthermore, 
this emotional trauma can lead to juvenile depression, conduct disorders, 
sleeping disturbances, and difficulty with communication skills.136
It is true that in Rutter v. Rutter, the allegations were child abuse.137
Arguably, catching the father hurting the children is more important than 
 130. For analyses of how these disputes can affect children, see Judge Don R. Ash, Bridge Over 
Troubled Water: Changing the Custody Law in Tennessee, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 769, 773-74 (1997); 
Robert E. Emery, Easing the Pain of Divorce for Children: Children’s Voices, Causes of Conflict, and 
Mediation Comments on Kelly’s “Resolving Child Custody Disputes”, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 164, 
169 (2002). 
 131.  See, e.g., Pollock, 154 F.3d at 604 (mother recorded conversations between daughter and 
father);  Thompson, 838 F. Supp. at 1537 (mother recorded conversations between father and three- and 
five-year-old children). 
 132.  See, e.g., Pollock, 154 F.3d at 604 (“Courtney . . . was upset and complaining of Judge Mor-
ris's decision to require her to live with [her mother].”). 
 133. The adversarial nature of divorce already causes children to be “used as currency in emotional 
transactions.” Ash, supra note 130, at 774. 
 134. Id. at 773–74. 
 135. See, e.g., Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1998).  
 136. Ash, supra note 130, at 773. 
 137. Rutter v. Rutter, 730 S.E.2d 626, 633 n.16 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). 
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any lack of security or comfort the children may feel.138 However, the ap-
pellate court stated that there was no evidence, in the videotape or other-
wise, to support Stacy’s allegations.139 Stacy could have alleged that she 
thought Charles was committing any crime, regardless of what reasons she 
had for believing so, and that would be sufficient under the Georgia stat-
ute.140
It is possible to create a rule where, under circumstances where there 
is convincing evidence that there is some sort of abuse taking place, the 
judge can then allow more fact gathering.141 However, under the statutes 
that exist now, or the lack thereof, individuals can record spouses without 
any prerequisite showing of evidence. 
E. Video cameras can bring in evidence that the judge should not be con-
sidering
In contentious divorce proceedings, spouses are likely to accuse each 
other of dozens of things, such as having an affair,142 committing child 
abuse,143 or even engaging in bestiality,144 and the judge has probably heard 
many of them before. However, hearing these allegations can be very dif-
ferent from seeing them. 
For example, Kevin and Alice Latham are getting a divorce, and they 
are fighting for custody over their two daughters. Alice thinks that Kevin 
cannot handle raising the two girls, so she places video cameras around the 
house to use against Kevin in the custody proceedings. One daughter, 
Kelly, is reacting poorly to her parents’ marriage dissolving and has started 
going out to parties late at night, and sometimes police officers drive her 
home. When this happens, both parents often yell at Kelly and tell her they 
will send her to boarding school if she keeps it up. One night, around two 
in the morning, Kelly comes home and wakes up her father, who has been 
sleeping on the couch. Angry at her behavior and that Kelly woke him up at 
such a late hour, Kevin starts yelling at Kelly, telling her if she keeps this 
 138.  For analysis of the “privacy versus security” debate, see generally Kenneth E. Himma, Priva-
cy Versus Security: Why Privacy is Not an Absolute Value or Right, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857 (2007).
 139. Rutter, 730 S.E.2d at 633 n.16. 
 140. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2) (2010). 
 141. Currently, there are other protections in place, such as obtaining orders of protection, calling 
DCFS, obtaining experts to watch the children with the father, etc. See for example 325 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/2 (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.740 (2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (2013); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-103 (2008); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-501 (2001). 
 142.  See, e.g., Lee, 477 N.W.2d at 431. 
 143.  See, e.g., Zamstein, 692 A.2d at 783; Kroh, 567 S.E.2d at 762. 
 144.  See, e.g., Kroh, 567 S.E.2d at 762.  
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up, he is sending her to boarding school. The yelling wakes up Alice, who 
decides to come to Kelly’s defense and tries to look like the reasonable 
parent in front of the camera. Alice uses the video in the custody proceed-
ings, making it look like Kevin is unreasonable and would just ship the kids 
off to boarding school if he got custody. This recording might bias the 
judge in the custody proceedings, despite the fact that both parents have 
yelled at Kelly for the same behavior.145
Also, going back to the Alex and Lindsey Johnson hypothetical, Alex 
appears to have caught Lindsey committing adultery. The recording may 
sway the judge, even though most states have created a “no fault” divorce, 
and adultery is not one of the factors typically listed in division of assets 
statutes.146 By admitting video recordings into divorce and custody pro-
ceedings, people may bias the judge in their favor, even when other party 
has not done anything legally wrong. 
IV. PROPOSALS
There are several ways to protect the individuals that current video 
surveillance laws do not protect, and while this section lists a few, this list 
is not all-inclusive. The possible methods of protection from surreptitious 
video surveillance, especially in divorce proceedings, can include creating 
a broad law to cover video surveillance, adding a section disallowing these 
videos in divorce proceedings to existing statutes, or creating a presumptive 
evidentiary rule that excludes videos from evidence. 
A. The legislature can create a broad law to cover video surveillance 
Creating a law covering video surveillance, as the legislature did in 
Georgia, has many advantages. While the Georgia statute left a gap that 
allowed for misuse in Rutter, the law in place provides some restrictions. 
For example, the law only allows surreptitious videotaping on the owner’s 
property so long as the owner has the intent to provide security, to prevent 
crime, or to detect crime.147 This would rule out video evidence where a 
party can prove to a certain extent that the recorder made the video record-
ings for any other purpose. While it may not be difficult for an individual to 
 145.  For example, in Thompson v. Dulaney, the court pointed out “the transcripts [between 
Thompson and his children] were introduced. At the custody hearing, the court determined that both 
Thompson and Dulaney were fit to be named guardian of the children, but nonetheless awarded Denise 
Dulaney custody.” 838 F. Supp. at 1537. 
 146. Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, A.L.I. § 4.09, at 
732 (2002). 
 147. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2)(C). 
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allege that they are trying to catch a crime in the act, there is a chance that 
the opposing party can introduce evidence that the recorder had an ulterior 
motive. 
It is probably better for the states to have a statute that explicitly states 
what to do under these circumstances. For example, a statute that generally 
prohibits video recordings “out of public view” and without consent, like 
the Georgia statute does in its first section, is a good place to start.148
Providing certain exceptions, like the Georgia and Michigan statutes do for 
public policy, can make sense, so long as the exceptions are limited as sug-
gested in the subsection below.149
B. For states with video recording statutes, add a section prohibiting use in 
divorce proceedings 
This solution is only applicable for states such as Georgia and Michi-
gan that have statutes addressing the issue of surreptitious video surveil-
lance. The main issue with these statutes is that they remain ambiguous as 
to the legality of surreptitious spousal recordings and the recordings’ ad-
missibility in domestic relations proceedings.150
The first problem with the Michigan and Georgia statutes is that their 
exceptions leave them open for misuse. The statutes need to narrow the 
applicability of their exceptions from “security purposes, crime prevention, 
or crime detection” and “security monitoring.”151 For example, the statute 
could state that the recorder can only make these recordings with the inten-
tion of turning them over to the police for prosecution if they catch a crime 
or security breach. Alternatively, the statute could prohibit the use of the 
recordings in the event that the recordings have not caught a crime. 
A second problem with the Georgia statute is the provision that states 
that the videos are allowed into “judicial proceedings” because the statute 
does not clarify the type of proceeding.152 It is probably consistent with the 
intent of the legislature to allow videos in to criminal proceedings, as the 
recorder is supposed to take these videos with the intent to provide security, 
to detect crime, or to prevent crime, and the statute states that the recorder 
may give the videos to a district attorney or a law enforcement officer.153 It 
is possibly also within the legislative intent to allow videos into certain 
 148. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2). 
 149. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2)(C); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539d (2004). 
 150. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2)(C); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539d. 
 151. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2)(C); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539d. 
 152. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2)(C). 
 153. See id.
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civil proceedings, such as trespass. However, that part remains unclear. It is 
also unclear as to whether the legislature intends for this evidence to be 
admissible in a battery case, a breach of contract case, or other civil cases. 
It is highly unlikely that the legislature created the statute with the intent 
that the recorder uses the videos in divorce proceedings, but with the cur-
rent language of the statute, that also remains unclear.154 Even if the legis-
lature wants the obtained surveillance to be admissible in most circum-
circumstances, it could provide a narrow exception for domestic relations 
proceedings.
C. Create a presumptive evidentiary rule for divorce proceedings 
Another possible way to prevent many of the problems associated 
with surreptitious video recordings is to create a presumptive evidentiary 
rule that the recorder cannot bring the recordings into divorce proceedings. 
Therefore, the rule would provide a rebuttable presumption that the judge 
will not admit the recordings. However, if the rule is only presumptive, the 
parties can overrule it by some showing of need.155 This need could be, for 
example, a showing of probable cause that a crime is being committed, or a 
showing of compelling need for the video recordings. This rule would pre-
vent most of the problems associated with introducing video recordings 
into divorce proceedings. However, this rule would not prevent the record-
ings from taking place, for better or worse. 
CONCLUSION
Under current laws, there are limited protections from surreptitious 
video recordings by spouses during divorce. The current laws and judicial 
remedies for these recordings are inadequate for preventing spouses from 
making these recordings and introducing the recordings in divorce court. 
This is a problem because it can lead to increased adversity; the recordings 
can be taken out of context; the recording can be used out of spite; allowing 
this to happen can have an adverse effect on children; and, these recordings 
can capture evidence that the judge should not consider. With all of the 
problems that this poses, either the state legislatures should enact statutes 
 154.  See id.
 155.  See, e.g., John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380, 1384 (Penn. 1990) (presumption of legitimacy 
can be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary); Newburgh v. Arrigo, 443 A.2d 
1031, 1035 (N.J. 1982) (presumption of marriage validity may be overcome by clear and convincing 
evidence); Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 635, (1993) (pre-
sumption of reasonableness can be overcome “by proof by a preponderance” that the assumptions were 
unreasonable).
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remedying this lack of protection or the judiciary should create an eviden-
tiary presumption to exclude the recordings. 
